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Abstract
Prior research has examined factors that motivate
executives in general to seek advice from external peers.
The literature is silent however regarding what IT
governance mechanisms motivate CIOs to mindfully
seek advice in their external advice networks. Our
research shows that simply applying the advice of the
prior literature in the CIO and IT governance context
can be counterproductive. We analyze data from a
survey of 99 municipal corporations to show that an
effective configuration of IT governance mechanisms
fits and changes over time with the firm’s financial
performance and state of IT enactment. The lessons
learned are instructive for practitioners, while also
highlighting the importance of attending to context in IT
governance research.

1. Introduction
Firms bring about their own downfall when they
become preoccupied with internal operations while less
and less in touch with the external environment [6]. In
so doing, they develop ‘blindspots’: perceptual filtering
routines by which they attend to and select information
that confirms their assumptions while ignoring
information that disconfirms their assumptions. These
filtering routines reinforce the existing mindset; they
reduce ambiguity and provide a perception of
orderliness that makes organizational life seem more
predictable and, hence, more manageable. By producing
a neatly ordered version of reality, they insulate firms
from the complexities of the external environment. The
key problem is these filtering routines lead to a lack of
awareness regarding critical external happenings such
as threats and opportunities in emerging technologies,
changing customer demands, and intelligence failures
[3]. The lack of awareness leads to misalignment
between IT and the functioning of the organization in
relation to the organization’s environment [22], which
can bring about organizational failure [6].
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Mitigating this risk requires a heightening of
sensitivity to external events, such as threats and
opportunities of emerging technologies. To this end,
CEOs today are asking their CIOs to play bigger roles
in the growth agenda by exploring for external advice
regarding new strategic IT initiatives that can enable
faster, more agile responses to emerging opportunities
and threats, as part of IT governance [18]. External
advice emanates from three sources: peer firms; market
partners such as customers and suppliers; and, resources
in the local market such as educated workforces [28].
Whereas the latter two sources are market-based, our
focus is on new insight derived from peer firms in the
same industry, which is the type of contextualized
information that has great potential to improve firm
performance [28].
By adopting a discerning or ‘mindful’ approach to
seeking advice regarding strategic IT initiatives from
peers, CIOs can learn from peers’ successes and avoid
their mistakes. They can reduce the risks of making a
poor decision because estimates of the costs and
potential returns can be made based on the experience
of prior adopters [12]. They can also economize on costs
of experimentation and broad market search for
alternative solutions because these costs are borne by
first-movers [40]. However, studies show that
executives are not necessarily motivated to mindfully
seek external advice from peers [20, 21]. Such lessmindful external advice seeking leads firms to adopt IT
initiatives that harm or fail to improve firm performance
[13]. It is in firms’ interests, therefore, to employ IT
governance mechanisms that can motivate CIOs to
mindfully seek advice in their external advice networks.
The literature is silent, however, regarding IT
governance mechanisms that motivate mindful search
for strategic IT initiatives [27]. Thus, the open question
remains: what IT governance mechanisms motivate
CIOs to mindfully seek advice in their external advice
networks? This is our research question.
To address the research question, we conducted a
structured survey to test the explanatory power of two
IT governance mechanisms in motivating CIOs to
search for IT initiatives and IT-enabled change
initiatives that could contribute to improve firm
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performance: (1) executive monitoring, and (2)
financial incentives. Both mechanisms have been
theorized to affect executives’ motivations toward
external advice seeking behaviors [21] but we do not
know the combined effects in the context of CIOs’
search for IT initiatives and IT-enabled change
initiatives that could contribute to improve firm
performance. Hence, we follow a prior study [21] of
contextual factors to examine the effects of (3) prior
firm financial performance on executives’ adviceseeking behaviors. We also examine potential
contingency of the foregoing effects upon (4) firms’
state of path dependent learning to use IT strategically
in daily routines (i.e., IT enactment [4]), which is
thought to constrain what strategic IT initiatives firms
are ready and motivated to learn [7]. Findings from our
study elucidate how different IT governance
configurations motivate mindful CIO advice seeking
contingent upon focal-firm context. Implications for
policymakers and promising avenues for future research
close the paper.

2. Theoretical foundation
IT governance is an integral part of corporate
governance, not only because officers’ oversight of IT
functions can be mandated by legislation [1], but also
because active board/executive involvement in ITrelated decisions is associated with higher firm
performance [14]. IT governance consists of two
dimensions: (1) organizational leadership structures and
(2) business processes that ensure that the firm’s IT
supports and extends its strategy and objectives [11].
The two dimensions are enabled by two underlying
functions respectively that we adopt from the IS
literature: (1) IT governance mechanisms [14] and (2)
IT enactment [4].
Firms design and orchestrate IT governance
mechanisms as a means of rationalizing, directing and
coordinating the firm’s IT-related decision making [14].
Well-designed and orchestrated IT governance
mechanisms are expected to produce IT-related
decisions and enactments that are more tightly aligned
with a firm’s strategic intentions. The IT governance
team contributes to the value firms derive from IT by
recognizing pain points, trigger events and other
symptoms of need for organizational change; by goal
setting and measurement, in which the impacts of IT on
firm performance are vigilantly monitored; and by
promoting change by rewarding managers’ efforts in
realizing value from enacting IT [7]. IT enactment refers
to the notion that the features of technology are used by
actors in their daily actions and routines, which
contribute to outcomes such as firms’ financial
performance [4].

In the context of IT enactment, it is the CIO that is
responsible for identifying strategic objectives to
change some aspect of their firm, seek available
technologies or strategies which may fit their objectives,
and then provide the ‘go ahead’ for actors within the
firm to acquire and implement the IT in support of
achieving the strategic objectives [17]. It is also the CIO
that possesses both the general lexicon of business
management and the specialized language and
knowledge of IS practitioners that facilitates discourse
on strategic IT initiatives with colleagues at peer firms
[36]. Hence, it is the CIO that is expected to be the
foremost boundary spanner that facilitates inflows of
fresh information with new insights from peer firms that
can help to improve IT enactment.
A boundary spanner can be defined as an individual
employed at a firm who currently has, or previously had,
direct contact(s) with peers at other firms’ through
professional associations, meetings, conferences, task
forces, and so forth [45]. Through these personal
encounters, boundary spanners form relationships with
contacts in other firms that provide the conduit for
inflows of advice from peer firms [28]. CIOs’ boundary
spanning role is found to significantly affect strategic IT
initiative performance by importing external knowledge
and integrating internal knowledge [25]. As boundary
spanners, CIOs are influenced by peers’ choices of IT
products or services, and they benchmark the firm’s
business benefits derived from IT usage against those
derived by other firms. The external ‘advice network’ is
constituted when the CIO decides which peer firms to
turn to for advice [29].
Access to peers in CIO’s external advice networks,
and the perspectives they formed through the experience
of implementing an IT and strategic IT initiative in their
own context, can help CIOs to make sound judgments
about the likely costs and payoffs in their own
organization, when committing to the strategic IT
initiative is best to take place, and how implementation
can best be pursued [37]. Hence, on-going exploration
in CIOs’ advice networks can help firms to remain
viable over time by continually renewing the ability to
adapt; that is, to maintain alignment between IT and the
functioning of the organization in relation to the
environment. This ability to adapt is a key factor in
firms’ financial performance over time.
The motivation to improve firm performance is
central to the thesis of mimetic isomorphism, which
states that firms within an industry come to imitate each
other in the structures (e.g., technologies) and strategies
they implement because they learn from each other
about particular technologies and strategies adopted by
admired (i.e., higher performing) firms and mimic those
firms’ IT and strategy choices [23]. In so doing, CIOs
can improve their own firm’s financial performance,
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because higher performing firms have knowledge of
more rewarding opportunities on which the seeker can
capitalize. Therefore, it is in the best interests of the firm
to motivate CIOs to on-going advice seeking for more
rewarding strategic IT initiatives.
Management theorists contend that executives have
a natural motivation toward an instrumentality of selfinterest [20]. In this view, executives are motivated to
seek advice from peers in similar contexts, reasoning
that their advice is likely to affirm and help defend the
executives’ current strategic decisions, whereas peers in
different contexts are more likely to offer alternative and
disconfirming advice. This reasoning would suggest
that CIOs are motivated to seek advice from peers at
firms with similar performance, rather than peers at
admired, higher performing firms. The problem with
this advice-seeking behavior is that the CIO foregoes the
payoffs of learning how to replicate more successful
strategic IT decisions from higher performing firms,
how to avoid pitfalls in the course of implementing a
more rewarding strategic IT initiative, and how to make
sound judgments about the likely costs and payoffs and
when committing to the strategic IT initiative is best to
take place [12]. In short, advice seeking motivated by an
instrumentality of self-interest can expose the firm to
agency costs in the form of poor strategic IT decisions.
This self-interested motivation consequently results in
advice-seeking behavior that can be labelled ‘lessmindful’ toward the best interests of the firm [41].
Notwithstanding the interests of the firm in
motivating CIOs to mindful advice seeking, the
literature is silent with regards to IT governance
mechanisms at firms’ disposal that can motivate CIOs
to seek external advice for strategic IT initiatives that
are more rewarding for the firm. To ameliorate this gap,
we proceed to theorize and empirically assess the causal
relationships between IT governance mechanisms and
CIO’s external advice seeking behaviors. The proposed
theoretical framework, depicted in Figure 1, is explained
next.

3. Hypotheses development
In the perspective of executive advice network
generation literature, an executive commences advice
seeking when encountering a problem or opportunity
the individual does not have sufficient confidence or
knowledge to solve alone (e.g., [29]). Particularly when
the problem or opportunity involves unstructured,
vague, and complex situations or an uncertain
environment, executives are motivated to seek external
peers to help interpret the problem, decompose it,
identify the relevant and significant problem
parameters, and possible solutions. And after finding a
possible solution, executives may contact a peer to

affirm ideas, confirm judgments, or validate beliefs.
This perspective does not exhaust all possible sources of
executives’ motivations for seeking advice in external
advice networks. However, we believe it identifies firm
performance as perhaps the most salient contextual
source of motivations for CIOs seeking to gain
alignment between information technology (IT) and the
functioning of the organization to survive in an
uncertain environment. We will therefore examine firm
performance as a contextual motivating factor for CIOs.
But first, we develop hypotheses regarding what IT
governance mechanisms motivate CIOs to mindfully
seek advice in their external advice networks.

Figure 1. Theoretical framework: IT
governance mechanisms motivating CIOs to
mindful external advice seeking

3.1. Mindful external advice seeking (outcome)
Following Fiol and O'Connor [9] we conceptualize
managers’ mindfulness in terms of perceptual accuracy,
which can be defined as how accurately managers
perceive the value of external strategic IT initiatives. In
our case, perceptual accuracy would refer to the
congruence between the value CIOs subjectively
perceive of adopting external advice regarding strategic
IT initiatives, and the objective value of such initiatives
in the referent firms. The objective value of strategic IT
initiatives should be assessed in terms of the relative
financial performance of the referent firm [38], but
executives are not necessarily motivated to critically
evaluate advice by seeking such objective evidence.
Instead, executives can have a self-interested motivation
to seek advice from poor performers in an effort to
defend their prior strategic decisions, which creates
agency costs for the firm when IT initiatives fail to
contribute to improved financial performance [21].
Therefore, it is in the best interests of the firm to
motivate CIOs to actively search for advice from
referents at firms that objectively contributes to higher
financial performance (i.e., mindful).
Next, we theorize the antecedents and contextual
factors that can motivate CIOs to mindful advice
seeking in the interests of the firm. We address the
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antecedents in terms of (1) executive monitoring, and
(2) financial incentives, and we address contextual
factors in terms of (3) prior firm financial performance
and (4) focal firm state of IT enactment as follows.

3.2. IT Governance
In order to motivate CIOs to seek out more
rewarding IT opportunities in the best interests of the
firm, rather than taking a self-interested defensive
approach to advice seeking, corporate governance
researchers advocate for governance mechanisms that
increase the alignment of executives' personal interests
with the interests of the firm, key among which is strong
firm financial performance [21]. Such alignment
essentially increases the personal consequences to CIOs
of meeting, or failing to meet, firm financial
performance targets. Two general mechanisms for
aligning CIOs’ interests with the firms’ interest in strong
financial performance are (1) executive monitoring of
CIOs’ strategic decisions, and (2) financial incentives
that are contingent upon achieving their firms’ financial
performance objectives as follows [21].
3.2.1. Executive monitoring. One of the most common
corporate governance mechanisms for monitoring and
oversight of IT is the IT steering committee [14]. The IT
steering committee consists of senior executives from
multiple areas of the firm that, collectively, have
oversight to ensure that strategic IT initiatives are
attuned to the firm's risk tolerance and strategic
directions [44]. Executives that vigilantly monitor
strategic decision-makers do not simply defer to them or
act as “rubber stamps” for their decisions [21]. Instead,
they demand justifications and explanations for
proposed strategic initiatives and constructively
criticize proposed initiatives when they believe those
initiatives are ill advised. This would suggest that
executive monitoring motivates CIOs to validate that
new advice contributes to relatively higher performance
in the source firm (i.e., mindful) instead of favoring
advice from lower performing firms to defend CIOs’
prior strategic decisions (i.e., less-mindful). Based on
the literature we can advance the hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1. Executive monitoring motivates
CIOs to mindfully seek external advice from peer firms.
3.2.2. Financial incentives. To the extent that
executives benefit financially from improvements in
their firm’s financial performance, they are more willing
to engage in behaviors that enhance the firm’s financial
performance [21]. To that end they are motivated to
make superior strategic decisions, and consequently
they are motivated to seek out a wide range of opinion
on strategic issues from peer firms. Because higher

performing firms know about more rewarding
opportunities [23], we would expect CIOs motivated by
an instrumentality of improved firm performance to
seek advice from higher performing firms (i.e., mindful)
instead of favoring advice from lower performing firms
to defend CIOs’ prior strategic decisions (i.e., lessmindful). Based on the literature, we can advance the
hypothesis:
Hypothesis H2. Financial incentives to improve firm
performance motivate CIOs to mindfully seek external
advice from peer firms.
The foregoing section discussed IT governance
mechanisms to motivate mindful advice-seeking
behaviors. Next, we discuss contextual factors.

3.3. Focal firm prior financial performance
Extant literature states that poor firm financial
performance relative to peers is an important source of
uncertainty that is likely to impel decision makers to
search for information regarding more rewarding
opportunities [20]. Low firm financial performance
signals gaps between strategic IT decisions and the
firm's performance requirements, which calls into
question the veracity of the current strategy. To the
extent that CIOs’ beliefs about strategy are reflected in
the firm’s current strategy, they feel uncertainty
regarding their beliefs that informed their strategic
decisions. This uncertainty evokes psychological
distress and anxiety, which activates a deep-seated
motive to restore a sense of certainty. To restore a sense
of certainty, executives tend to seek external advice
from executives at other firms in an effort to confirm or
update their underlying interpretations of the
environment. When actors regain a sense of certainty,
they tend to stop searching for advice [5]. This would
suggest that poor firm performance motivates CIOs to
seek advice from higher performing firms (i.e., mindful)
instead of favoring advice from lower performing firms
to defend CIOs’ prior strategic decisions (i.e., lessmindful). Based on the literature, we can advance the
hypothesis:
Hypothesis H3. Poor firm financial performance
motivates CIOs to mindfully seek advice from peer
firms.

3.4. Focal firm state of IT enactment
Organizational change proceeds by combining the
insights of new information with existing knowledge of
how to operate, thereby learning to tap the unexplored
potential of current IT and/or finding ways to exploit
new IT in practice [28]. The potential for firms to
understand and act on new information (e.g., new ideas
of how to enact IT in support of better and more efficient
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organizational performance) is constrained by firms’
absorptive capacities. The premise of absorptive
capacity states that the potential for a firm to understand
fresh insights (e.g., regarding the potential of IT) and
exploit it in practice in a future period (t+1) is a function
of the accumulated knowledge they can exploit in the
current period (t). Exploitation is a dynamic capability
based on routines that allow the firm to refine, extend,
and leverage existing competencies or to create new
ones by incorporating new knowledge into its
operations; that is, firms’ realized absorptive capacities.
In turn, intensity of effort to exploit knowledge in the
current period is critical to enhancing firms' potential to
understand and act on new knowledge in a future period.
This cumulative path dependent learning process is
reflected in the literature as characteristically distinct
states of IT enactment (e.g., [7, 16]), where more
advanced states are thought to contribute to better and
more efficient organizational performance [4]. IT
enactment can be assessed in terms of five states as
follows [7, 15]. In state 1, Initial, firms know how to
enact IT in support of business processes that are ad hoc
and monitored in local departments. They are ready to
learn how to standardize IT infrastructure. In state 2,
Repeatable, firms know how to enact a standardized IT
infrastructure, but business processes remain ad hoc and
locally monitored. The firm is ready to learn how to
enact the infrastructure to efficiently coordinate
business processes across functional departments. In
state 3, Defined, firms know how to exploit IT
infrastructure for sharing data to support and monitor
cooperation between departments, and they are ready to
learn how to standardize business processes within and
across departments. In state 4, Managed, firms know
how to exploit enterprise systems to support and
monitor standardized end-to-end enterprise processes,
and they are ready to learn how to extend their enterprise
systems to exploit new external technologies. In state 5,
Optimized, firms know how to rapidly connect and
disconnect new technologies in their supply chains and
industry to their enterprise systems without damaging
the integrity of core data and business processes.
The salient insight of the foregoing ‘states’ view of
organizational context is that firms in different states of
technology enactment are likely to have different
capacities to understand, enact and monitor the
performance impacts of strategic IT initiatives
emanating from CIOs’ external advice networks.
Therefore, we can expect that the combined effects of
our antecedents – executive monitoring, performancebased financial incentives, prior firm financial
performance – on CIO’s motivations towards mindful
advice seeking will be contingent upon firms’ state of
IT enactment. Based on the literature, we can advance
our final hypothesis:

Hypothesis H4. The configurations of IT governance
mechanisms that influence CIOs to mindfully seek
external advice are contingent upon the organization’s
state of IT enactment.

4. Methodology
We assessed the four stated hypotheses in the
context of local governments in Canada. These
organizations are corporations responsible for the
administration of twelve public services: public
administration, fire and police services, roadways,
public transit, drinking water, wastewater, storm water
management, solid waste management, parks and
recreation, library services, and land use planning. The
corporations’ executives have been under tremendous
pressure to reform traditional business models for public
service delivery because they need to develop
innovative ways to address fiscal restraints while
fulfilling citizen demands for public service [30]. In
addition, IT governance is a legally mandated element
of corporate governance in Canada [1]. Thus, local
governments in Canada provide a potentially rich
context in which to study mechanisms of IT governance.
Furthermore, local governments in Canada have a
common industry association, the Municipal
Information Systems Association (MISA), which has
the explicit mandate to provide “a forum for the
interchange of information between municipal
representatives, leading to the more efficient use of
municipal information systems” (misa.on.ca). Thus,
local governments in Canada provide a potentially rich
context in which to study CIOs’ external advice
networking behaviors with peers.
Data were collected from CIOs by means of a
structured questionnaire, which consisted of preexisting measures from the literature implemented in the
form of a web-based survey. We obtained a database of
potential survey respondents from LexisNexis. The
original database had 505 English-speaking local
governments across Canada that fit the MISA member
profile (i.e., minimum $5.2 million in annual revenues).
Using the MISA member profile assured us that the
corporations recruited had sufficient scope for strategic
IT initiatives that could potentially benefit from “the
interchange of information between municipal
representatives” (misa.on.ca), while excluding very
small corporations whose size could bias the analysis
[39].
Recruitment letters were mailed to the CIOs. This
resulted in 106 CIOs responding as potential advice
seekers. Data for seven respondents were incomplete
and therefore dropped from further analysis, and data for
99 respondents remained. The response rate of 19.6%
was within the accepted range of prior unsolicited IS
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surveys that involved CIO respondents (12% to 24.6%,
[2, 31, 39, 42]).
We applied fuzzy set qualitative comparative
analysis (fsQCA; http://www.fsqca.com) to assess
configurations of causal attributes in qualitative data
that explain the sample of cases [10, 34]. fsQCA
identifies configurations in which individual causal
attributes are consistently present when the desired
outcome is present, or consistently absent when the
desired outcome is present, or not associated
consistently with the desired outcome. fsQCA also
estimates the coverage of each configuration, which
refers to the proportion of cases where the outcome can
be explained by the respective configuration of causal
attributes. However, it is also desirable to identify
configurations that appear systematically and not by
chance. We therefore confirmed that our sample sizes
for fsQCA meets or exceeds the 15 cases suggested by
Marx [19]. This threshold is recommended because it
can identify systematic configurations and reject
random configurations for our model with five causal
attributes.
Results from evaluating descriptive statistics of our
sample versus the population using ANOVA show that
the distribution of local governments in each
province/territory by frequency (t=0.043) and
percentage (t=1.000) did not differ significantly from
the population. These results validate the
representativeness of the sample with respect to the
population of local governments in the original
database. The frequency distribution of local
governments by state of IT enactment showed that too
few local governments were at state 5 or state 1 to
include in our analyses. Therefore, our analyses focused
on the 96% of firms in states 2, 3 or 4 of IT enactment.
We then combined respondent data with archive data
from audited annual financial reports for seekers and
their named sources. The combined dataset represented
114 unique matched pair source-seeker dyads for
analysis.

4.1. Measurement operationalization
4.1.1. Advice seeking dyads. We adopted the Cross and
Sproull [5] instrument to ask respondents to name the
CIOs/IT directors at up to five peer local governments
whom they believed were most helpful in providing
advice (regarding strategic IT initiatives) in the past
twelve months. Obtaining the names of advice sources
allowed us to identify matched pair source-seeker
dyads.
4.1.2. Mindful external advice seeking (outcome).
Following the perceptual accuracy conceptualization of
mindful advice-seeking, we next computed the relative

fit between the perceived helpfulness [5] of source
firm’s advice as reported by CIOs, and the source firm’s
actual financial performance relative to the seeker
firm’s actual financial performance (i.e., the subjective
versus objective value [38]). For objective measures, we
adopted three financial ratios that are used in public
reporting: return on assets (ROA), own source revenues
(OSR), and financial reserves (RESV). Perceptual
accuracy was computed as the fit between the perceived
value and objective value of source’s advice in each
dyad to obtain an index of mindful advice seeking
ranging from ‘0.00-poorest fit (lowest perceptual
accuracy)’ to ‘1.00-best fit (highest perceptual
accuracy)’.
4.1.3. Prior firm financial performance. The three
financial ratios (ROA, OSR, RESV) computed for each
seeker firm were used to assess the effects of seeker
firms’ prior financial performance on external advice
seeking behavior, and were compared with the sample
mean (i.e., higher or lower, H3).
4.1.4. Executive monitoring. We adopted the preexisting and validated 3-item instrument for measuring
board/executive monitoring from Westphal [43], in
order to measure the extent of executive monitoring by
the IT steering committee.
4.1.5. Financial incentives. We adopted the preexisting validated instrument from a prior study [24]
that asks respondents to indicate the extent to which the
firm uses performance-based compensation and the
extent to which performance-based compensation
systems are closely linked to improved firm financial
performance. This instrument is designed to assess
managers’ motivations to seek advice based on the
perceived significance of the financial reward and the
link to financial performance outcomes.
4.1.6. Focal firm state of IT enactment. In order to
assess firms’ states of IT enactment, we adopted an
instrument for the government context from Jaklič and
Štemberger [15] that was based on the industry standard
COBIT framework [7, 26] and asks CIOs which state
description best characterizes their organization at
present: Initial, Repeatable, Defined, Managed,
Optimized, as defined in section 3.4. CIOs’ responses
were coded as nominal variables (1-5) to group firms in
similar states for analysis.

4.2. Reliability and validity of questionnaires
Five experts reviewed the initial structured
questionnaire. Based on their feedback, we made minor
changes to the questionnaire to fit the Canadian local
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government context (e.g., the CIO is typically called an
‘IT director’). We assessed the corrected inter-item
correlations and Cronbach’s alpha of the multi-item
executive monitoring measure to mitigate artifacts in
our results due to measurement error. The three-item
measure exhibited good convergent validity and
reliability (α>0.7) [8].

4.3. Analysis
We computed causal configurations based on 9 truth
tables: 3 different outcome measures (i.e., mindful
advice seeking based on ROA, OSR and RESV ratios)
x 3 sets of firms at states 2, 3 or 4 of IT enactment. Three
of the nine truth tables were dropped from further
analysis because insufficient cases met the minimum
consistency criterion of 0.80 [10, 32]. This left six truth
tables for further analysis: two truth tables for firms in
each of the three analyzed states of IT enactment. Based
on these data, we proceeded to compute the causal
configurations that explain CIOs’ mindful advice
seeking.
We produced two relevant reports for each analysis
using fsQCA 2.5 [33] in accordance with Ragin and
Giesel [34]: (1) the core solution, which shows core
causal attributes that are present in all cases exhibiting
the outcome (mindful advice seeking), and (2) the
parsimonious solution, which weighs counterfactual
cases against supporting cases for each combination and
then identifies peripheral causal attributes that can have
an important combined effect on the outcome. In
accordance with the reporting protocol of prior literature
(e.g., [10]), the core and peripheral causal attributes that
emerged from fsQCA are depicted with large and small
circles respectively in Table 1. A shaded circle ()
denotes a causal attribute that, when present, has a
causal effect on the outcome, mindful advice seeking. A
circle crossed out (U) denotes a causal attribute that
when absent has a causal effect on the outcome. Hence,
the six columns in Table 1 labelled C1, C2… C6 depict
six alternative configurations of causal attributes that in
combination (i.e., logical AND relationships) with each
other explain the outcome, CIOs’ mindful advice
seeking, for firms at a given state of IT enactment.
Redundant configurations of core and peripheral
causal attributes have been combined for presentation in
Table 1 in the interest of parsimony [34]. Consequently,
the coverage for each configuration (i.e., the
explanatory power of a causal configuration) reported in
Table 1 is the minimum coverage based on core causal
attributes only. Coverage estimates the proportion of
cases where the outcome can be explained by the
respective configuration of causal attributes. All causal
configurations reported in Table 1 exceed the minimum
configuration consistency threshold of 0.75, which

indicates good explanatory power in configurational
analysis [32].
Table 1. Results of configurational analyses
Firms in:
Causal Configurations:
Causal Attributes
Prior
(ROA)
Financial
Performance
(OSR)
(Reserves)
Executive
Monitoring
Financial
Incentives

State 2
C1
C2
OSR RESV

State 3
C3
C4
ROA
RESV


U

U
  


Coverage: 0.53
Consistency: >0.75



0.59
>0.75

State 4
C5
C6
ROA OSR

U

U


U
U
U
U


U  

0.29
>0.75

0.44
>0.75



0.29
>0.75

0.82
>0.75

5. Results
Results from configurational analysis (Table 1)
address the research question: what IT governance
mechanisms motivate CIOs to mindfully seek advice in
their external advice networks? The results show that
CIOs of firms in state 2 of IT enactment are motivated
to mindful advice seeking when their firms have high
efficiency (ROA), independence from grants from
higher-tier governments (OSR), and cash reserves,
(RESV) and the effect is enhanced by executive
monitoring of IT impacts (column C1). The latter two
conditions, cash reserves and executive monitoring, are
sufficient to motivate advice seeking from peers with
high cash reserves (column C2).
CIOs of firms in state 3 of IT enactment are
motivated to mindful advice seeking when their firm has
low operating efficiencies (ROA) and high dependency
on grants from higher tiers of government (OSR), and
when executives actively monitor IT impacts on firm
performance (column C3), as predicted. However, the
absence of financial incentives linked to efficiency
motivates mindful advice seeking in state 3 firms,
contrary to our prediction (Hypothesis H2, which we
discuss below).
For CIOs of firms in state 4 of IT enactment,
financial incentives linked to efficiency provide a strong
explanation for CIOs’ mindful advice seeking, as
predicted (column C5). Whereas these results can
provide guidance for practitioners and policy makers,
the findings for warrant further discussion of our
hypotheses as follows.

6. Discussion and Implications
Whereas prior research has examined factors that
motivate executives in general to seek advice from
peers, the literature is silent regarding IT governance
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mechanisms that motivate mindful search for strategic
IT initiatives. Our findings show that simply applying
the advice of the prior literature in the CIO and IT
governance context can be ineffective or
counterproductive under certain conditions. In the
discussion that follows, we tease out this context
sensitivity to identify what IT governance mechanisms
motivate CIOs to mindfully seek advice in their external
advice networks in specific contexts.

6.1. State-appropriate IT governance
As per Hypothesis H1, prior literature advocates
executive monitoring to motivate executives’ mindful
external advice seeking [21]. We found support for this
hypothesis in the CIO and IT governance context in five
but not all six configurations. Configuration C5 shows
that for firms in State 4 IT enactment, the significance
of executive monitoring pales in comparison to financial
incentives in motivating CIOs to seek advice from
higher efficiency (ROA) peer firms. The results suggest
that firms should adopt executive monitoring as a
significant IT governance mechanism for motivating
CIOs mindful to search mindfully for efficiencyimproving initiatives in States 2 and 3, but the IT
governance configuration should be changed to
emphasize financial incentives in State 4.
As per Hypothesis H2, prior literature advocates
financial incentives to motivate executives’ mindful
external advice seeking [21]. In the CIO and IT
governance context, however, we found financial
incentives were not causal attributes, or should be
absent, or were consistent causal attributes, depending
on a firm’s state of IT enactment as follows.
In the context of firms in state 2 of IT enactment,
financial incentives were not consistent causal attributes
explaining CIOs’ motivations for mindful advice
seeking. Instead, the sufficient causal attribute was poor
financial performance (which we discuss later).
In state 3 of IT enactment, the absence of financial
incentives explains CIOs’ motivations for mindful
advice seeking, contrary to the predicted effect. This
may be explained by research [35] that suggests firms in
state 3 face the challenge of investing in new integrated
enterprise systems such as ERP. The implementation of
ERP incurs high costs that include but are not limited to
software licenses, maintenance, project management,
change management, and user training, and the financial
payoffs can be delayed for years. In this case, tying
CIOs’ financial incentives to short-term improvements
in financial results will have the opposite of the intended
effect: it will ensure that CIOs’ personal interests are
misaligned and directly conflict with the best interests
of the firm to make the necessary investments in ERP.

In state 4 of IT enactment, the presence of financial
incentives explains CIOs’ motivations for mindful
advice seeking (as predicted). This may be explained by
research [35] that suggests firms in state 4 have
rationalized and replaced with ERP a large number of
disparate, incompatible, but often interlinked legacy
systems that impose high costs for updates, support,
maintenance and license fees for redundant
functionality. Hence, it is not until state 4 that firms
begin to reap the efficiency benefits of their investments
in ERP. For this reason, aligning CIO interests with
improved operating efficiencies can be an effective IT
governance mechanism for firms in state 4 of IT
enactment.
For practitioners, our findings regarding the
sensitivity of IT governance mechanisms to state of IT
enactment (Hypothesis H4) underscore the need for
executives and policymakers to actively align incentive
plans with the changing state of the firm and to avoid
relying on a single approach if the firm is to motivate
CIOs to actively pursue advice in the best interests of
the firm. For researchers, confirmation of a moderating
effect in Hypothesis H4 highlights the importance of
attending to differences in context when analyzing IT
governance data from firms in different states of IT
enactment.

6.2. The interaction of performance and state
of IT enactment
As previously stated, executive advice network
generation literature contends that an executive
commences advice seeking when encountering a
problem or opportunity the individual does not have
sufficient confidence or knowledge to solve alone. Prior
literature adopting this view proposed poor financial
performance as a poignant example. McDonald et al.
([21]) specifically examined whether executives facing
poor performance would seek out friendship peers to
confirm their views (i.e., less-mindful), or seek out other
peers to disconfirm false assumptions (i.e., mindful).
They found both responses which, they explained, could
mean that some executives become defensive and seek
validation of their current strategy when they perceive a
threatening problem, while other executives seek out
more advice with discretion to inform alternative
strategies. In the CIO and IT governance context,
however, our findings support another explanation – the
interaction of performance and state of IT enactment as
a contextual factor – as follows.
Findings for Hypothesis H3 concerning prior firm
performance exhibited opposing causal effects in firms
at different states of IT enactment. Specifically, poor
prior firm financial performance can motivate mindful
advice seeking (as predicted) in the context of firms in
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state 3 and 4 of IT enactment. However, CIOs embedded
in firms in state 2 of IT enactment that engage in mindful
advice seeking typically have above average prior
financial performance, contrary to the prediction of
Hypothesis H3. The latter effect is consistent, however,
with conjecture in the extant literature when we consider
the focal firm context. Firms in state 2 lag behind their
state 3 and 4 peers in implementing ERP. On one hand,
CIOs of firms in state 2 could feel justified in not
adopting ERP more quickly and comprehensively when
firm financial performance is above average. On the
other hand, firms “performing relatively poorly may be
preoccupied with their competitive disadvantage. A
firm in this category, concluding that it has fallen behind
others in innovating with IT, may come to disparage its
own competence in this arena. Consequently, in
contemplating the innovative activities of others, it may
be more inclined to look for models to slavishly emulate
than to critically appropriate for local fit” ([37], p. 573).
For practitioners, this finding suggests that low
performing firms in state 2 of IT enactment can be
especially difficult to engage in industry discourse, and
consequently industry associations and/or (higher tier)
governments need to adopt different approaches to reach
and educate these firms. For researchers, this conclusion
suggests that more research is needed to understand how
to engage low performing state 2 firms in learning how
to use IT to improve firm performance from higher
performing peer firms in their industry.
In sum, our findings elucidate the significance of IT
governance in motivating mindful search for more
rewarding IT initiatives. However, no single IT
governance approach is most effective in promoting
mindful external advice seeking in all cases. For
practitioners, the findings underscore the need to
strategically update the configuration of IT governance
mechanisms as the firm matures to different states of IT
enactment. For researchers, the findings underscore the
need to attend to focal firm context when examining the
motivating effects of IT governance configurations. The
proposed theoretical framework incorporates sensitivity
to differences in firms’ context and advances a
foundation for future research on IT governance
concerning mimesis and diffusion of IT.
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